A discrete-time dynamic game of seasonal water allocation
Allocation saisonnière de l'eau dans un contexte de jeu dynamiques en temps discrets
Résumé
We present a method for the derivation of feedback Nash equi- libria in discrete-time finite-horizon nonstationary dynamic games. A partic- ular motivation for such games stems from environmental economics, where problems of seasonal competition for water levels occur frequently among heterogeneous economic agents. These agents are coupled through a state variable, which is the water level. Actions are strategically chosen to max- imize the agents individual season-dependent utility functions. We observe that, although a feedback Nash equilibrium exists, it does not satisfy the (exogenous) environmental watchdog expectations. We devise an incentive scheme to help meeting those expectations and calculate a feedback Nash equilibrium for the new game that uses the scheme. This solution is more environmentally friendly than the previous one. The water allocation game solutions help us to draw some conclusions regarding the agents behavior and also about the existence of feedback Nash equilibria in dynamic games.
Les auteurs s'intéressent au problème de la coordination du niveau d'eau pour différents agents économiques. Le problème est modélisé à l'aide d'un jeu dynamique en horizon fini. L'équilibre de Nash en feedback du jeu n'est pas satisfaisant du point de vue environnemental. Ils proposent un schéma incitatif où l'équilibre de Nash feedback du modèle est plus respectueux de l'environnement.