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Article Dans Une Revue International Tax and Public Finance Année : 2015

Tax evasion and social information: an experiment in Belgium, France, and the Netherlands

Résumé

We experimentally study how receiving information about tax compliance of others affects individuals’ occupational choices and subsequent evading decisions. In one treatment individuals receive information about the highest tax evasion rates of others in past experimental sessions with no such social information; in another treatment they receive information about the lowest tax evasion rates observed in the past sessions with no such social information. We observe an asymmetric effect of social information on tax compliance. Whereas examples of high compliance do not have any disciplining effect, we find evidence that examples of low compliance significantly increase tax evasion for certain audit probabilities. No major differences are found across countries.
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Dates et versions

halshs-01155326 , version 1 (19-07-2021)

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Lefebvre Mathieu, Pierre Pestieau, Arno Riedl, Marie Claire Villeval. Tax evasion and social information: an experiment in Belgium, France, and the Netherlands. International Tax and Public Finance, 2015, 22 (3), pp.401-425. ⟨10.1007/s10797-014-9318-z⟩. ⟨halshs-01155326⟩
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