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Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Public Economics Année : 2010

The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors

Résumé

When a firm undertakes risky activities, the conflict between social and private incentives to implement safety care requires public intervention which can take the form of both monetary incentives and also ex ante or ex post monitoring, i.e., before or after an accident occurs. We delineate the optimal scope of monitoring depending on whether public monitors are benevolent or corruptible. We show that separating the ex ante and the ex post monitors increases the likelihood of ex post investigation, helps prevent capture and improves welfare.

Dates et versions

halshs-00754410 , version 1 (20-11-2012)

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Citer

David Martimort, Yolande Hiriart, Jérôme Pouyet. The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors. Journal of Public Economics, 2010, 94 (11-12), pp.1008-1019. ⟨10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.07.005⟩. ⟨halshs-00754410⟩
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