Insect pollination is widely used for agricultural production and contributes significantly to the global value of crops. In this study, the impact of insect pollinators on the social welfare is assessed within a general equilibrium. What would be the general consequences of a production loss due to pollinators decline? How are changes in profits distributed between producers of pollinated goods and other producers? These questions are studied within two alternative distribution of property rights over the firms: the case when agents possess and equal share of the firms (egalitarian ownership structure) and the case where each agent possesses one firm (polarized ownership structure). For each case, we consider the case when agent and firms are homogeneous, and the case when firms are heterogeneous. Under the egalitarian ownership structure, a pollinator decline will result in the decrease of the utility of both agents. When the distribution of the property right is polarized, the utility of the owner of the firm that produces the good which is not pollinator-dependent, will increase. Under specified condition, the social welfare might increase, especially if the production function of the firm of the non dependant sector is more efficient than the other.